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Introduction
Welfare states are often reduced to their role as pro-
viders of social protection and redistribution. 
However, they also crucially affect employment 
creation and the structuring of class. This is the argu-
ment that Esping-Andersen put forward in The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) and developed 
further in Changing Classes (1993):
The structure of the welfare state is a key feature in the 
contemporary process of social stratification: it creates 
and abolishes ‘empty slots’, it helps decide who fills 
them and how they are to be rewarded, it defines what is 
undertaken within them, and, finally, it shapes the pattern 
of mobility between them. (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 20)
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Since 1990, the argument that the occupational 
structures of different welfare regimes evolve dif-
ferently has come under question. Globalization, 
unleashed capitalism and austerity have been seen 
as severely limiting the scope for government inter-
vention and for national idiosyncrasies in job crea-
tion (Streeck, 2009). As a result, technological 
change associated with computerization has been 
expected to lead to similar patterns of occupational 
change across countries (Autor et al., 2008).
Contrary to this convergence argument, Esping-
Andersen predicted that welfare regimes would con-
tinue to diverge on their post-industrial employment 
trajectories. Institutional differences should be par-
ticularly consequential for one class: low-paid inter-
personal service workers. As technology and 
globalization have little impact on interpersonal ser-
vices, people need to provide them locally and in 
person. At the same time, interpersonal services may 
be produced by any of the three agents that Esping-
Andersen defined as the cornerstones of a welfare 
regime: the market, the state or the family. First, 
governments can privilege the market. By permitting 
wages in interpersonal services to decline, prices for 
these services will fall, market demand increase and 
employment rise in the private sector. Second, gov-
ernments can assume responsibility for employing 
workers at wages closer to the median by creating 
public service jobs within the welfare state. Third, 
the solution can reside in families engaging in self-
servicing, with the consequence that home produc-
tion replaces market-supplied or public services.
The three alternatives schematically coincide 
with the dominant strategies of Esping-Andersen’s 
three welfare regimes. The liberal welfare regime 
stimulates market growth in low-paid private ser-
vices. The social-democratic regime creates a dis-
proportionate number of jobs in mid-paid public 
services. The conservative regime delegates inter-
personal service to women within the household. As 
a result, the occupational structure of service socie-
ties should evolve in different directions – and the 
welfare state continues to be ‘the midwife of post-
industrial employment evolution’ (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 192).
The evolution in the ranks of low-skilled interper-
sonal service workers should thus provide the litmus 
test for the welfare regime argument. According to 
Esping-Andersen (1990), this class should strongly 
expand at the occupational bottom end in the liberal 
welfare regime, undergo moderate growth around the 
middle in the social-democratic regime, and stagnate 
in the conservative regime. Yet since lower growth in 
low-paid service jobs may lead to higher unemploy-
ment, an analysis of occupational change must focus 
both on qualitative change in the job structure and on 
quantitative change in the number of jobs.
Esping-Andersen convincingly argues that insti-
tutions channel firms’ labour demand into different 
occupational outcomes. However, we expect an 
institutional factor at the margins of the welfare 
regime to be decisive for change in the employment 
structure: the evolution of labour supply in terms of 
skills. The idea is that the number and productivity of 
lowly educated workers are not a given entity that is 
immune to government influence. Over the last dec-
ades, not only did jobs for the unqualified become 
scarcer, but so did the unqualified themselves. In the 
absence of large migrant inflows, educational expan-
sion reduced the number of low-educated workers 
and increased the productivity of the average worker 
in interpersonal services. Yet some countries suc-
ceeded better than others in taking advantage of edu-
cational expansion to produce a compressed skill 
structure. Moreover, different welfare regimes did 
not create the same incentives for employers to 
invest in skills and to adopt technologies enhancing 
the productivity of interpersonal service workers 
(Acemoglu, 2003; Gautié and Schmitt, 2010). 
Accordingly, we argue that the interaction between 
welfare regimes and labour supply drives the 
employment structure of different countries into dif-
ferent directions.
Esping-Andersen (1990: 197–217) compared the 
employment structure over the 1970s and 1980s for 
Germany, Sweden and the United States. This article 
adopts the same comparative perspective and analy-
ses the pattern of occupational change over the 1990s 
and 2000s for three welfare regimes: Britain, 
Germany and Denmark, where Britain stands for the 
liberal, Denmark for the social-democratic and 
Germany for the conservative welfare regime. Our 
analysis is set at the individual level and based on 
data stemming from Britain and Denmark’s labour 
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force surveys and Germany’s Socio-Economic 
Panel. With only three cases, the added value of our 
analysis lies in depicting precisely what happened in 
the employment structure over the last two decades 
rather than determining why it happened.
Our article is structured as follows. The next sec-
tion reviews the literature on the link between wel-
fare regimes and occupational change and introduces 
a set of hypotheses. The following section presents 
our data and analytical strategy. We then provide 
descriptive evidence for occupational upgrading 
based on measures for social class and job-quality 
quintiles, before analysing the change in unemploy-
ment and wages. The ensuing section documents 
educational expansion and the impact of immigra-
tion on occupational change. We conclude with a 
discussion of our key findings.
Welfare regimes and 
occupational change
Esping-Andersen’s book The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism has been mainly acclaimed for 
its typology of welfare states and the independence 
from the market that welfare states offer to citizens. 
However, the argument of welfare states as agents of 
decommodification mainly looked to the past and 
soon proved outdated as welfare states increasingly 
turned towards re-commodification (Pierson, 2001) 
and social investment (Esping-Andersen et al., 
2002). In contrast, the book’s argument about the 
stratifying impact welfare states have on post-indus-
trial societies was clearly forward-looking. Esping-
Andersen predicted a variety of future employment 
scenarios for post-industrial societies:
Different welfare-state/labor market interactions 
produce different post-industrial trajectories. They 
influence not only the rate of growth of services, but 
also the relative emphasis on social-welfare activities 
as opposed to personal services; they influence the skill 
and occupational composition of the labor force. 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 192)
In the vast literature on occupational change, a strong 
focus on political institutions – welfare regimes – is 
unusual. The consensus view argues that long-term 
occupational change is driven by technology 
(Manning, 2004). Over time, workers are displaced 
from sectors in which technological change has a per-
vasive impact such as agriculture and manufacturing, 
to sectors where technology’s influence is more lim-
ited, such as social and personal services. In the 
1990s, economists agreed that skill-biased techno-
logical change was leading to a linear increase in the 
demand for highly educated workers at the expense 
of the less educated (Berman et al., 1998). The out-
come was seen as positive in terms of occupational 
upgrading, but as negative in terms of bleak employ-
ment prospects for the low educated.
This consensus view was shattered in the early 
2000s by two studies showing a trend towards a 
polarizing employment structure in the United States 
(Wright and Dwyer, 2003) and the United Kingdom 
(Goos and Manning, 2007). The dominant explana-
tion of polarization was again technology, but this 
time the focus was on tasks rather than skills (Autor 
et al., 2008). Computers take over routine tasks typi-
cally done in mid-paid clerical and production jobs, 
but have little impact on non-routine analytical tasks 
required in highly paid professions or on non-routine 
interpersonal service tasks done in low-paid service 
jobs. Rather than lead to occupational upgrading, 
technological change may thus hollow out the mid-
dle of the employment structure and therefore result 
in polarization.
While it is uncertain whether technological change 
leads to upgrading or polarization, it is clear that it 
should affect West European countries in a similar 
way – to the extent that Western companies have 
access to similar types of technology. It is here that a 
focus on institutions and a comparative research 
design proves useful. Technological progress may 
account for common trends in occupational change 
across countries, but it is clearly insufficient to 
unearth the causes of cross-country variation.
According to Esping-Andersen, institutions 
should be particularly consequential for how coun-
tries deal with the technologically induced ‘cost dis-
ease’ associated with William Baumol (1967). The 
idea is that technological change increases produc-
tivity in manufacturing to a greater extent than in 
services. Manufacturing will therefore shed workers 
who, in turn, look for jobs in services. Yet the service 
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sector’s capacity for job expansion may be limited 
by its low productivity growth: interpersonal ser-
vices such as caring for the elderly, cutting hair or 
serving drinks have an indispensable handicraft 
attribute and necessarily involve face-to-face con-
tact. If wages in services follow those in manufactur-
ing, the costs of personal services will constantly rise 
and ‘service sector labor will tend to out-price itself’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 193).
The shift from (higher-productivity) employment 
in manufacturing to (lower productivity) jobs in 
interpersonal services is mediated by a country’s 
welfare regime. Thereby, Esping-Andersen (1999: 
111–2) distinguishes three ideal-typical institutional 
responses to Baumol’s cost disease. One response 
consists of letting wage inequality increase. By 
allowing earnings in interpersonal services to adjust 
to lower productivity growth, the consequence is 
strong growth in service jobs paid at poverty-level 
wages. A second response consists of subsidizing 
personal services by creating these jobs within the 
public sector – notably in elderly care, childcare, 
health and education. A third response lets earnings 
in interpersonal services follow wage developments 
in the economy – otherwise these services will strug-
gle to recruit workers. As a result, low-productivity 
interpersonal services become too costly to develop 
within the market and are mainly carried out within 
the family.
Of course, governments choose a mix of the three 
ideal-typical responses. Still, countries of the liberal 
welfare regime tend to favour the first response of 
private services, whereas countries of the social-
democratic regime disproportionately resort to the 
second response of public services, mainly financed 
through consumption taxes. The Bismarckian wel-
fare state of the conservative regime, geared towards 
social insurances, has never made the provision of 
public services a priority. A compressed wage struc-
ture and high payroll taxes hamper the job creation 
in low-skilled private services. This may leave the 
family as the primary caretaker of young children, 
the elderly, the sick and the handicapped (Scharpf, 
2000: 219–20). 
Every one of the three responses has a drawback 
according to Iversen and Wren’s (1998) service tri-
lemma. The liberal response of low-paid private services 
leads to large wage inequality. The social-democratic 
response of expanding public services creates escalating 
fiscal demands on the state. The conservative response 
of delegating services to the family results in high unem-
ployment among the lowly educated.
Baumol’s cost disease and Iversen and Wren’s 
service trilemma thus lead to bleak expectations 
about post-industrial employment trajectories. 
However, they share one questionable premise, 
namely that the quantity and quality of low-skilled 
people is constant over time. They presuppose that 
both the number and productivity of low-skilled 
workers are a given entity immune to government 
influence. We argue that this presupposition is at 
odds with the evolution of labour supply – both in 
terms of productivity and numbers.
By means of a generous benefit system and strin-
gent wage-setting rules, a welfare regime can push 
the wages of low-skilled workers closer to the 
median. In this situation, employers have two 
options: they can abstain from hiring those workers 
whose marginal productivity is lower than their 
wage. Alternatively, they can try to increase the pro-
ductivity of these same workers in order to make it 
worthwhile hiring them. The reasoning is that if the 
wages of workers are downwardly sticky, their pro-
ductivity must be changed upwards.
How do you increase the productivity of interper-
sonal service workers? The basic idea is that high 
minimum wages and small wage differentials make 
firms more willing to adopt technologies comple-
mentary to low-educated workers. Technological 
change is thus seen as being, to some extent, endog-
enous (Acemoglu, 2003: 127).1 And the potential of 
technology – and hence productivity increases – in 
low-skilled services is probably larger than com-
monly assumed. In supermarkets, self-service 
check-outs are replacing a great number of cashiers. 
In airports, self-service check-in is becoming the 
rule rather than the exception. In large restaurants, 
radio systems allow waiters to send orders electron-
ically to the kitchen and serve more customers in 
less time. In cleaning and maintenance, advances 
made in sensors open up large fields for robotics 
and thus productivity-increasing devices. In public 
transport, unmanned trains operate in a growing 
number of cities.
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In sum, labour market institutions and, more gen-
erally, the welfare regime have an influence on what 
production techniques are adopted in low-skilled sec-
tors of different countries – and there is considerable 
scope for productivity growth in interpersonal ser-
vices, as Wren (2013: 7) shows in her cross-national 
comparison of productivity growth rates in different 
subsectors. A large multi-country study led by Gautié 
and Schmitt (2010) on employment in low-wage sec-
tors finds that nursing assistants and call centre 
employees tend to be better skilled and more versatile 
in Denmark and Germany than in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This leads to higher 
worker productivity and translates into wages closer 
to the national median in the former two countries 
(Lloyd et al., 2010: 460; Méhaut et al., 2010: 320). 
Technology adoption and human resources practices 
thus seem more likely to upgrade the employment 
structure in the conservative and, above all, social-
democratic welfare regimes than in the liberal one.
However, the reliance on technology and better 
skilled workers not only improves productivity and 
justifies higher wages, but also reduces the employ-
ment opportunities for low-educated people. The 
increase in productivity in low-skilled services lim-
its wage inequality, but possibly exacerbates the lack 
of low-skilled jobs. Do governments, by solving the 
problem of quality, run into a problem of quantity? 
Much depends on the labour market’s supply side. 
Over the last two decades, not only jobs for the 
unqualified became scarcer but also the unqualified 
themselves. While technological progress increased 
firms’ demand for qualified labour, educational 
expansion made sure that ever larger proportions of 
each cohort had at least medium levels of skills. 
Therefore, in the ‘race between education and tech-
nology’, labour supply driven by rising educational 
attainment seems to have kept pace with labour 
demand shaped by continuous technical change 
(Goldin and Katz, 2008).
Some countries succeeded better than others in 
taking advantage of educational expansion to pro-
duce a compressed skill structure. The International 
Adult Literacy Surveys suggests that both the dispar-
ity of literacy among the population as well as the 
share of people with poor literacy are significantly 
lower in Denmark or Germany than in Britain or the 
United States (Freeman and Schettkat, 2001: 584; 
Gesthuizen et al., 2011: 270–1). Therefore, thanks to 
strongly rising skill levels, a country may achieve 
low rates of unemployment without job expansion in 
the labour market’s bottom end.
However, the skill distribution of a country’s 
workforce not only depends on its educational sys-
tem, but also on immigration. The large inflow of 
low-skilled Hispanic immigrants into the American 
labour market partly explains the strong expansion 
of low-end service jobs in the United States over the 
1990s (Wright and Dwyer, 2003: 309). Without a 
growing pool of workers willing to fill these low-
wage jobs, the wages of these jobs would have had 
to rise, these services would have become more 
expensive and these jobs would not have been cre-
ated in the market, but been partly substituted by 
household production (Cortes and Tessada, 2011). In 
the period under study, a possible equivalent to 
Hispanic immigration in the United States was the 
strong surge in Polish and Baltic immigration to 
Britain in the early 2000s – a migratory flow which 
was much larger than in Germany or Denmark.2
These arguments allow us to spell out three sets 
of expectations about the evolution of (1) interper-
sonal services workers, (2) occupational change and 
(3) low-educated unemployment in the three coun-
tries under study.
1. Following Esping-Andersen, the category of 
interpersonal service workers should grow 
strongly at the bottom of the occupational 
structure in Britain’s liberal welfare regime, 
expand moderately at wages closer to the 
median in Denmark’s social-democratic wel-
fare regime and stagnate in Germany’s con-
servative welfare regime.
2. As a consequence, the employment structure 
should expand at both ends and lead to occu-
pational polarization in Britain, whereas 
occupational upgrading is the more likely 
outcome in Denmark and Germany.
This leads to two competing hypotheses about the 
evolution of unemployment:
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3.1. Low-educated unemployment can only be 
kept at bay under the condition that the num-
ber of interpersonal service jobs expands 
and the occupational structure polarizes. 
Polarization and low unemployment in Britain 
should therefore contrast with upgrading and 
high unemployment among the low-educated 
in Denmark and Germany.
3.2. Growth in interpersonal service jobs and 
polarization are not a necessary condition for 
low unemployment among the low educated. 
The creation of low-skilled interpersonal ser-
vices jobs – and thus polarization – strongly 
depends on the evolution of labour supply in 
terms of skills. All three countries experi-
enced strong educational expansion, but only 
Britain large inflows of low-paid migrants. 
As a consequence, polarization should only 
be observed in Britain – regardless of the 
evolution of low-skilled unemployment.
Country selection, data and 
strategy of analysis
Our analysis focuses on three countries which come 
close to Esping-Andersen’s ideal-typical welfare 
regimes: Britain as a liberal, Denmark as a social-
democratic and Germany as a conservative welfare 
regime. For these three countries, we analyse change 
in the occupational structure for the period between 
1990/1991 and 2007/2008. These two cut-off points 
are at the end of long cyclical upswings that were 
followed by two Europe-wide recessions (1991–
1993 and 2008–2010).
We use large scale micro-level datasets which 
contain detailed information on individuals’ occupa-
tion and education: the national labour force survey 
for Britain (UK-LFS, spring quarter), the Danish 
labour force survey stemming from Denmark’s 
cooperation with Eurostat (EU-LFS) and the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Since the Danish 
labour force survey does not include earnings, we 
impute earnings of occupations from the merged 
Danish samples in EU-SILC 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
Our target population includes both employees and 
the self-employed and is restricted to people aged 18 
to 65 years who spend at least 20 hours per week in 
paid employment. Table 2 in Appendix 1 gives an 
overview of the key features of these datasets.
Our analytical approach based on the three wel-
fare regimes has little causal traction, since our three 
countries differ in many potentially relevant dimen-
sions. Therefore, we are much better prepared to 
describe what happened in the employment structure 
than to determine the causes for why it happened. 
Accordingly, our objective is to establish the pattern 
of occupational change as accurately as possible, 
using two different approaches.
First, we use a class measure which combines a 
hierarchical with a horizontal criterion (see Oesch, 
2006). The hierarchical criterion distinguishes 
between more or less advantageous employment 
relationships. We simply divide occupations into 
two hierarchical levels that roughly correspond to 
the split between the middle and the working class. 
The second dimension is horizontal and distin-
guishes occupations according to four different types 
of work logic: an interpersonal, organizational, tech-
nical and independent work logic. By combining the 
hierarchical and horizontal dimensions, we obtain an 
8-class schema (see Table 1). This schema allows us 
to clearly distinguish interpersonal service workers.3 
Individuals are allocated to different classes based 
on information about (a) their employment status (to 
distinguish employees from employers and the self-
employed who are allocated to the independent work 
logic) and (b) their occupation as measured with 
International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO)-88 four-digit or comparable codes. The 
schema’s rationale and operationalization is dis-
cussed in greater detail elsewhere (Oesch, 2006; see 
also Oesch, 2013: 55–6).
Second, we use an analytical strategy which 
traces the evolution of job-quality quintiles over 
time – a strategy that has become increasingly popu-
lar to document change in the occupational structure 
(e.g. Fernández Macías, 2012; Goos and Manning, 
2007; Wright and Dwyer, 2003). This approach 
implies that occupations are distinguished as pre-
cisely as possible given the data at hand (ISCO-88 
codes at the four-digit level or comparable codes).4 
We thus distinguish between 108 (Denmark), 145 
(Germany) and 171 (Britain) different occupations. 
We then need to determine their quality. While a 
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large array of job attributes matter to people and 
hence affect a job’s quality, we consider earnings to 
be both the most relevant and most reliably measur-
able indicator of an occupation’s quality. Accordingly, 
we compute the median earning of each occupation 
by averaging the hourly median earning at the begin-
ning and the end of the period under study.
We thus equate occupational upgrading with an 
expansion of occupations with high median earnings 
at the expense of occupations with low median earn-
ings. Once we have calculated the median earnings of 
each occupation, all the occupations are rank-ordered 
from the lowest- to the highest-paid. These rank-
ordered occupations are grouped into five equally 
large quintiles, containing as close as possible to 
20 percent of total employment at the beginning of the 
period under study. We then determine the pattern of 
occupational change on the basis of how occupations 
in the different quintiles evolve in terms of employ-
ment (for more detail, see Oesch, 2013: 37–42).
The occupational hierarchy looks surprisingly 
similar in our three countries: sales assistants and 
farmhands are in the bottom quintile Q1, bricklayers 
and truck drivers in the lower-middle quintile Q2, 
secretaries and machine mechanics in the middle 
quintile Q3, nurses and police officers in the upper-
middle quintile Q4 and senior officials and medical 
doctors in the top quintile Q5.
Occupational change since 1990
We begin our empirical analysis by examining 
change in the class structure over the last two dec-
ades (see Table 1). Three evolutions are noteworthy. 
First, the evolution in the ranks of interpersonal ser-
vice workers seems consistent with Esping-
Andersen’s expectations. This class includes, among 
others, assistant nurses, waiters and shop assistants 
and expanded in Britain from 11 to 15 percent of the 
workforce, but remained stable in Germany at 
11 percent and in Denmark at 18 percent between the 
beginning of the 1990s and the end of the 2000s. 
Britain thus made up some ground in terms of inter-
personal service jobs with respect to Denmark. In 
Table 1. Change of workforce in occupational classes (share in %), 1990/1991–2007/2008.
Interpersonal service logic Technical work logic Organizational work logic Independent work logic
Socio-cultural (semi-) 
professionals
Technical (semi-) 
professionals
(Associate) managers Liberal professionals 
and large employers
 Medical doctors
Teachers
Social workers
Engineers
Architects
Technicians
Administrators
Consultants
Accountants
Entrepreneurs
Lawyers
Dentists
GB
DE
DK
 9 → 13
10 → 14
15 → 17
 8 → 8
10 → 10
 8 → 8
17 → 23
13 → 18
11 → 18
2 → 2
1 → 3
2 → 3
 Interpersonal service 
workers
Production workers Office clerks Small business owners
 Assistant nurses
Waiters
Shop assistants
Mechanics
Carpenters
Assemblers
Secretaries
Receptionists
Mail clerks
Shop owners
Independent artisans
Farmers
GB
DE
DK
11 → 15
10 → 11
18 → 18
25 → 16
36 → 23
24 →21
16 → 12
13 → 13
13 → 8
12 → 11
 6 → 7
 9 → 7
Data: see Table 2.
Notes: Values in grey/ in boxes indicate an employment share in 2007/2008 that is 20 percent higher/ 20 percent lower than in 
1990/1991. The shares refer to a target population of individuals aged 18–65 years who spend at least 20 hours per week in paid 
employment.
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contrast, Germany still lingered behind in terms of 
interpersonal services at the end of the 2000s.
Second, the stability in interpersonal service jobs 
contrasts with the substantial fall in employment 
among production workers. While taking place in all 
three countries, the relative decline of the industrial 
working class was particularly marked in Germany 
and Britain. Alongside production workers, the ranks 
of office clerks were also thinning: the workforce 
employed in occupations such as secretaries, recep-
tionists or mail clerks strongly decreased in Britain 
and Denmark, but remained unchanged in Germany.
Third, we observe in all three countries growing 
employment shares in the salaried middle class, 
notably among socio-cultural (semi-)professionals 
(e.g. medical doctors and teachers) and (associate) 
managers (e.g. administrators and consultants). 
While the former are disproportionately employed in 
the welfare state, the latter mainly work in private 
business services. Interestingly, the expansion 
among socio-cultural professionals was smallest in 
Denmark. Since the welfare states had developed 
earlier in Sweden and Denmark than in the rest of 
Europe, socio-cultural professionals had – like inter-
personal service workers – already constituted a 
large category in Denmark in the early 1990s. Hence, 
although Denmark witnessed slower growth among 
socio-cultural professionals and interpersonal ser-
vice workers than Britain or Germany since the early 
1990s, it still employed a larger proportion of its 
workforce in these two categories than the other two 
countries at the end of the 2000s.
These analyses suggest that the occupational 
structure of our three countries upgraded over the 
last two decades: the salaried middle class (compris-
ing socio-cultural and technical professionals as well 
as managers) expanded to reach about 42 to 44 per-
cent of total employment, whereas the employment 
share of the working and lower-middle class (service 
workers, production workers and clerks) fell to 
between 43 and 48 percent. Only in Britain do we 
observe substantial relative growth in one of the 
three lower-class categories, namely among inter-
personal service workers. Over this period, there was 
little change among employers and the self-employed 
which accounted for a stable share of 10 to 15 per-
cent of the workforce.
A look at the class structure only provides us 
with a rough picture of the overall pattern of occu-
pational change. To get a better idea, we examine in 
Figure 1 how employment evolved across five job-
quality quintiles, where quintile 1 is defined as com-
prising, in 1990, the 20 percent of employment in 
the occupations with the lowest median earnings 
and the top quintile the 20 percent of employment in 
the occupations with the highest median earnings. 
We further disaggregate the employment change in 
each quintile according to four occupational classes: 
(a) (associate) professionals and managers, (b) 
interpersonal service workers, (c) production work-
ers and (d) clerks.5
Figure 1 confirms that the employment structure 
upgraded in all three countries, as net job growth 
was everywhere strongest in the top quintile Q5. 
However, upgrading was clear-cut only in Denmark 
and Germany. In Britain, occupational change 
between 1991 and 2008 had a polarizing thrust to it 
as strong growth in the top quintile Q5 went along 
with moderate growth in the bottom-quintile 1 – a 
finding consistent with the pattern of change reported 
for Britain for the period 1979–1999 (Goos and 
Manning, 2007: 121).
A look at the occupational categories shows us 
that upgrading was driven, in all three countries, by 
the growing number of managers and professionals 
in the two top quintiles 4 and 5. In parallel, produc-
tion workers saw their employment decrease in the 
four bottom quintiles 1 to 4, whereas clerical jobs 
disappeared from the lower-middle quintiles 2 and 3. 
What sets the three countries apart from each other is 
the evolution among interpersonal service workers. 
Consistent with Esping-Andersen’s expectation, we 
observe growth of this category within the low-end 
quintile 1 in Britain. In Denmark, interpersonal ser-
vice jobs did not expand at the bottom of the occupa-
tional hierarchy, but in quintile 2, thus offsetting the 
small decreases in quintiles 1 and 3. In Germany, 
there was no growth in the employment share of this 
category.
Since interpersonal service jobs in Britain 
expanded exclusively in the lowest-paid occupations 
of quintile 1, differential growth in these jobs goes a 
long way in explaining why Britain’s employment 
structure polarized and why Germany’s did not. In 
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effect, without growth in interpersonal service jobs, 
Britain would have witnessed a similar-sized 
employment decrease in quintile 1 of about three 
percentage points, as did Germany.
The 1990s marked a particular decade for 
Germany: the short reunification boom giving way 
to a long recession. Occupational change may thus 
look very different in the 1990s than in the 2000s. 
We control for potential timing effects in Germany 
by analysing occupational change for four periods of 
six years each (the first period of 1984–1990 applies 
to West Germany only). At the beginning of each 
period, occupations are reallocated into the five 
quintiles so that each quintile again comprises 
20 percent of total employment.6 In order to illustrate 
the period-differences in employment growth, we 
compute these changes in absolute numbers.
Figure 2 shows that the first two periods 1984–
1990 and 1990–1996 coincided with clear-cut occu-
pational upgrading. Jobs expanded primarily at the 
top of the occupational hierarchy both during the 
boom of the late 1980s and the bust of the early 1990s 
when Germany lost more than a million jobs in the 
lowest-paid quintile 1, while creating half a million 
jobs in the highest-paid quintile 5. Occupational 
upgrading was thus particularly strong during the 
recession, as the burden of economic restructuring, 
firm downsizing and unemployment disproportion-
ately fell on low-educated workers. The two follow-
ing periods 1996–2002 and 2002–2007 were marked 
by a transition from upgrading towards a more polar-
ized pattern. While employment continued to expand 
most strongly in the highest earning occupations of 
quintiles 4 and 5 and fell in the middle quintile 3, there 
was also modest job growth in low-end quintile 1.
Germany’s evolution from upgrading towards 
polarization is consistent both with the thesis of 
polarized technological change (Autor et al., 2008) 
and the thesis of institutional change from a coordi-
nated economy to an unfettered model of capitalism 
(Streeck, 2009) – an argument to which we return 
below.
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Britain, 91-08 Denmark, 92-07 Germany, 90-07
(Associate)
managers &
professionals
Clerks
Production
workers
Interpersonal
service workers
Figure 1. Change in quintiles’ share of total employment in percentage points – contribution by occupational 
categories.
Relative change in employment in quintiles in percentage points:
Britain: Q1: 0.6, Q2: −4.6, Q3: −4.8, Q4: 0.2, Q5: 8.7
Denmark: Q1: −2.7, Q2: −4.6, Q3: 1.6, Q4: 0.8, Q5: 4.9
Germany: Q1: −2.6, Q2: −1.7, Q3: −1.9, Q4: −1.0, Q5: 7.2
Data: see Table 2.
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Low-skilled unemployment and 
relative wages
An open question is whether the social-democratic 
and conservative welfare regimes – exemplified by 
Denmark and Germany – pay for their sluggish 
growth of interpersonal service jobs with higher 
unemployment, notably among low-educated work-
ers. We examine this question in Figure 3 by show-
ing how the unemployment rate of low-educated 
workers evolved between 1991 and 2008.7
The unemployment rate of low-educated workers 
strongly depends on the business cycle and is thus 
closely related to the evolution of general unemploy-
ment: between 1991 and 2008, the correlation coef-
ficient (Pearson’s r) between the two time series is 
0.98 for Britain, 0.83 for Germany and 0.75 for 
Denmark. In Germany, low-educated unemployment 
doubled between 1992 and 2004 – from below 
10 percent to 20 percent – and remained at a high 
level of 15 percent in 2008. In stark contrast, Britain 
and Denmark witnessed a gradual decline of their 
low-educated unemployment rate between 1995 and 
2005 from over 12 percent to below 6 percent – until 
the outburst of the global financial crisis in 2008 led 
again to a rise.
Upgrading has thus not wrecked the labour mar-
ket prospects of low-educated workers. In 2008, 
their unemployment rate was below 7 percent in 
Britain and Denmark – and thus moderate despite an 
on-going process of occupational upgrading. 
Particularly noteworthy is the evolution in Denmark 
where the job structure was strongly upgrading, with 
sizeable job losses in the bottom-end quintile 1 
(–42,000 jobs between 1992 and 2007), but low-
educated unemployment nonetheless fell to below 
4 percent prior to the global financial crisis.
Unemployment rates may convey too optimistic a 
picture of the job opportunities of the low educated if 
involuntary labour market withdrawal takes other 
forms such as illness, disability, or domesticity. Many 
authors thus prefer the employment rate to the unem-
ployment rate. However, the low-educated employ-
ment rates (the employment-to-population ratios of 
low-educated individuals aged 25 to 64 years) do not 
show any general downward trend either. On the con-
trary, in Denmark we observe an increase prior to the 
Great Recession from a 5-year average of 62 percent 
(1991–1995) to 65 percent (2006–2010). For 
Germany, there was a substantial decline in the 1990s 
(from 53 percent in 1991–1995 to 48 percent in 1996–
2000), which was followed by a strong increase in 
Figure 2. Employment change in job quality quintiles in Germany over 6-year periods (in 1000 jobs).
Note: the period 1984–1990 applies to West Germany only.
Data: SOEP, 1984–2007.
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the 2000s to reach 55 percent over the period 2006–
2010. In Britain, the employment rate of low-edu-
cated workers increased from 61 (1991–1995) to 
66 percent (2001–2005), but fell again to 60 percent 
during the Great Recession (2006–2010) (OECD 
Education at a Glance Database).
Germany stands out as having higher levels of 
unemployment and lower levels of employment 
among the low educated than Britain and Denmark. Is 
this the price a conservative welfare regime has to pay 
for sheltering its wage structure? We analyse this 
question by plotting the evolution of interpersonal 
service workers’ relative wages against the evolution 
of their relative employment in Britain and Germany.8
Figure 4 shows the results and reveals that in 
1996, the hourly wages of interpersonal service 
workers relative to the national median wage were 
substantially higher in Germany than in Britain. 
Interpersonal service workers received, on average, 
73 percent of the median wage in Germany as com-
pared to 63 percent in Britain. Since 1996, however, 
wage-setting institutions became more inclusive in 
Britain, notably with the introduction of the national 
minimum wage in 1999. The opposite occurred in 
Germany where wage-setting institutions eroded 
under the influence of mass unemployment, 
employer exits from collective bargaining, the 
expansion in temporary agency work, the rise of 
‘mini-jobs’ and cutbacks in unemployment benefits 
linked to Hartz IV (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; 
Streeck, 2009).
Accordingly, Figure 4 shows interpersonal ser-
vice workers’ pay in Britain to have evolved in a 
U-shaped pattern: relative to the national median, 
their earnings dropped between 1993 and 1999, sta-
bilized over the period 1999–2002 and increased in 
the years from 2002 to 2008, when the minimum 
wage acquired real bite. In parallel, we observe a 
steady increase in the employment share of interper-
sonal service workers – with no apparent difference 
between periods when their relative wages were ris-
ing and periods when they were falling.
In Germany, the relative wages of interpersonal 
service workers increased between 1993 and 1996, 
but then declined steadily up to 2005 and remained 
stable thereafter. Interpersonal service workers’ 
share in total employment fell during the post-reuni-
fication crisis 1993–1996 (when relative wages had 
Figure 3. Low-educated unemployment rate in percent, 1991–2008.
Source: OECD Education at a Glance, various years.
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continued to rise) and slowly recovered after 1996 
up to 2005.
Our analysis of SOEP data suggests that job 
growth among interpersonal service workers primar-
ily took place in non-standard employment: In the 
bottom quintile 1, Germany lost 415,000 permanent 
jobs, but created 95,000 fixed-term jobs between 
1990 and 2007, notably among the young. The 
German increase in temporary jobs contrasts with the 
British experience. In 2008, only one out of twenty 
jobs in Britain’s bottom quintile 1 were on a fixed-
term basis (4.8%) as compared to one out of six jobs 
in Germany’s bottom quintile 1 in 2007 (17%; own 
computations based on UK-LFS and SOEP).
Despite the substantial fall in relative wages and 
the de-standardisation of the employment relation-
ship in Germany, Figure 4 shows that job growth in 
interpersonal services was anything but spectacular. 
While the employment share of interpersonal service 
workers constantly expanded in Britain between 
1993 and 2008 – resulting in an increase of 3.1 per-
centage points – the period of relative job growth was 
limited in Germany to the years between 1996 and 
2005, resulting in an increase of 1.5 percentage points 
only. Both in relative and absolute terms, Germany 
created fewer jobs in interpersonal service jobs than 
Britain – despite having a lower starting point in the 
early 1990s and having strongly decreased the pay of 
these occupations relative to the median.
The results in Figure 4 leave us with two puzzles: 
why did interpersonal service jobs stagnate in 
Germany despite a substantial increase in wage ine-
quality and a systematic de-standardisation of the 
employment relationship – and why did these same 
jobs grow in Britain after the introduction of the 
minimum wage in 1999? We argue that this appar-
ently paradoxical finding is explained, on the one 
hand, by the business cycle and economic policy 
and, on the other, by the evolution of labour supply.
The 1990s and 2000s were two decades during 
which Britain and Germany experienced contrasting 
business cycles. Britain enjoyed uninterrupted eco-
nomic growth of at least 2 percent of GDP between 
1994 and 2007. In contrast, Germany’s economy 
struggled with the post-reunification crisis over the 
period 1993–2004 when the German GDP grew by 
at least 2 percent in only 2 out of 11 years. The 
German response to this long crisis was wage 
restraint. Yet this strategy of internal devaluation did 
not only decrease the earnings in – and thus prices 
for – interpersonal services. It also depressed the dis-
posable income of German consumers. This proved 
Figure 4. Interpersonal service workers’ relative wages (as % of the median wage – left scale) and relative 
employment (as % of total employment – right scale). (a) Britain, 1993–2008 and (b) Germany, 1993–2007.
Data: BHPS, 1993–2008, SOEP, 1993–2007.
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problematic as the price elasticity of demand for 
interpersonal services is probably not very large – 
unlike for industrial goods. In other words, consumer 
demand for interpersonal services is relatively insen-
sitive to prices and hence to relative wages of the 
workers providing these services (Glyn, 2001: 710). 
In contrast, consumer demand for these services is 
strongly dependent on disposable income, and hence 
on the business cycle (Carlin and Soskice, 2009: 95). 
As a result of wage restraint, German exports picked 
up, whereas interpersonal service jobs stagnated 
under the pressure of austerity. Accordingly, the con-
tribution of private consumption to GDP growth in 
Germany has steadily declined since the mid-1990s 
as its economic model became increasingly depend-
ent on exports (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012: 273). 
The opposite scenario of growing real wages, grow-
ing domestic demand and growing GDP applied to 
Britain between the late 1990s and 2007, spurring 
the strong expansion in interpersonal service jobs.
Shifting labour supply: education, 
gender and nationality
Differences in the business cycle are only one part of 
the story. The other part is linked to the differential 
evolution of labour supply. Between the early 1990s 
and the late 2000s, the adult population of Britain, 
German and Denmark underwent a process of mas-
sive educational upgrading. The share of the popula-
tion aged 25 to 64 years without upper secondary 
schooling declined in all three countries: by 14 per-
centage points in Britain, by 8 percentage points in 
Germany and by 1.4 percentage points in Denmark. 
Over the same period, the proportion of the adult 
population with upper secondary education, consist-
ing of general degrees or vocational training, 
remained unchanged in Britain and Germany, but 
decreased by 12 percentage points in Denmark. 
These decreases were compensated for by the strong 
rise in the proportion of adults with tertiary educa-
tion. The increase amounted to 13 percentage points 
in Britain and Denmark and to 7 percentage points in 
Germany (own calculations based on UK-LFS, 
EU-LFS and SOEP).
The increase among university-trained workers at 
the expense of workers with compulsory schooling 
partially explains why the number of low-paid jobs 
could diminish without causing a rise in low-edu-
cated unemployment. In Britain, however, skill sup-
plies were also shaped by the strong surge in 
immigration from Eastern Europe (notably Poland, 
the Baltic States and the Slovak Republic) after the 
2004 enlargement of the European Union. These 
immigrants were often hired for jobs far below the 
occupations to which they would be assigned on the 
basis of their educational attainment (Dustmann et 
al., 2013). Through this downgrading, they may 
have provided the abundant and inexpensive labour 
supply that stimulated job creation at the low-skill 
end of the British labour market – a factor largely 
absent from the Danish and German labour markets 
of the 2000s.
We examine this argument in a last analysis by 
disaggregating relative change in employment for 
four different nationality-gender groups: national 
men, national women, foreign men and foreign 
women. The goal is to determine each group’s net 
contribution to the observed pattern of occupational 
change. The result is shown in Figure 5 and confirms 
that, in Britain, expansion in low-paid occupations 
of quintile 1 was exclusively due to job growth 
among foreign workers. The relative increase of 
quintile 1 by 0.6 percentage point was the result of a 
fall in employment among British men and women 
(−1.1 percentage points), which was overcompen-
sated by employment growth among foreign men 
and women (+1.8 percentage points). At the same 
time, in Britain, all four nationality-gender groups 
underwent a polarizing pattern of change where job 
growth was stronger at the bottom and the top than in 
the middle. Consequently, immigration contributed 
to the polarization of Britain’s employment struc-
ture, but it was not the only driving force.
In Denmark, foreign workers also increased their 
employment share in the two bottom quintiles 1 and 
2 (by 1.1 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively). 
But this increase was not large enough to compen-
sate for the large drop in employment among Danish 
men and, above all, Danish women within these two 
low-end quintiles. In Germany, employment shifts 
were very similar for nationals and foreigners. As in 
the two other countries, occupational upgrading in 
Germany was strongly driven by national women, 
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whereas national men saw their relative employment 
decline in the middle quintiles in all three countries.
Discussion and conclusion
What do our findings imply for Esping-Andersen’s 
argument that the welfare regime decisively shapes 
post-industrial employment trajectories? Consistent 
with his hypothesis, we observe an expansion of 
interpersonal service workers at the bottom of the 
occupational structure only in Britain’s liberal wel-
fare regime. The share of the workforce employed in 
interpersonal services stagnated in both Denmark 
and Germany. However, this is less surprising for 
Denmark than Germany, as interpersonal services 
accounted for a much higher proportion of employ-
ment in Denmark than in Germany at the beginning 
of the 1990s. This finding underlines that in Denmark 
– as in Sweden – the period of disproportionate 
employment growth in public services came to an 
end in the 1990s and 2000s (OECD, 2009). The class 
structure of the three countries under study thus 
became more similar over the last two decades and, 
contrary to Esping-Andersen’s expectation, we 
observe some convergence.
In all three countries, the strong increase in the 
ranks of professionals and managers and the parallel 
decline among production workers and clerks resulted 
in an upgrading of the occupational structure. This 
process was clear-cut in Denmark. In Britain, the 
growth in interpersonal service jobs led to a polarized 
version of upgrading as employment increased at both 
ends of the occupational hierarchy.
Of the three countries studied, we observe the 
most intricate employment trajectory in Germany. 
The Schröder government’s reform agenda led to 
employment de-standardisation and greater wage 
inequality. Germany took steps away from a coordi-
nated economy towards a more liberal model of capi-
talism (Streeck, 2009). While this evolution is visible 
in terms of increasing occupational polarization and 
growing wage inequality, it has not resulted in strong 
growth in interpersonal service jobs – as the combi-
nation of an export-based strategy with wage restraint 
and welfare state retrenchment depressed internal 
demand for much of the 1990s and 2000s.
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1993) was right when 
considering interpersonal service workers’ employ-
ment trajectory as decisive for post-industrial social 
stratification. Britain’s labour market would not have 
expanded at its occupational bottom-end without the 
growth in interpersonal service jobs, mostly filled by 
foreign workers. However, other factors than those 
originally singled out explain the divergent employ-
ment trajectories of our three welfare regimes. 
Differential growth in public sector employment no 
longer plays a major role. Rather, the evolution of 
labour supply and particularly immigration policy 
Figure 5. Change in quintiles’ share of total employment in percentage points by nationality-gender groups.
Data: see Table 2.
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– more liberal in Britain than in Denmark or Germany 
over the period under study – led to diverging out-
comes in our three countries.
Likewise, evidence in favour of the welfare 
regime hypothesis is mixed with respect to unem-
ployment. Our data do not lend support to the 
assumption that sectoral change and Baumol’s cost 
disease result in high levels of low-educated unem-
ployment if countries do not create large numbers of 
(low-end) interpersonal service jobs. True, Britain 
succeeded both in increasing its share of the work-
force in interpersonal services and in decreasing the 
unemployment rate of low-educated individuals. At 
the same time, Denmark also managed to halve its 
low-educated unemployment rate between the mid-
1990s and 2008 – but did so without witnessing any 
net job growth either in the labour market’s bottom 
quintile or in interpersonal services. A very similar 
scenario applies to another small and affluent 
European country, Switzerland (Oesch, 2013).
The dramatic increase in lower-tail earnings ine-
quality in Germany since 2000 makes the country an 
ideal test case for the hypothesis that low wage floors 
lead to job expansion in low-end services. Our data 
suggest that Germany’s socially divisive strategy of 
internal devaluation was insufficient to set a boom in 
interpersonal service jobs in motion. While Germany’s 
labour market policy became more liberal, its macro-
economic policy remained conservative.
If polarization of the employment structure is no 
precondition for full employment, what led the 
believers in Baumol’s cost disease model – or, for 
that matter, in Iversen and Wren’s service trilemma 
– astray? In our view, these models unduly focus on 
low-end service jobs as the principal source of 
employment growth in post-industrial societies, on 
two grounds.
First, employment growth has primarily taken 
place among (associate) managers and (semi-) pro-
fessionals either working in private business services 
or in health and education – and these services did 
not primarily expand at the bottom, but rather the 
middle and top of the occupational hierarchy (Wren, 
2013: 14–5). In contrast, jobs in low-end services 
have been growing slowly at best, declined at worst 
– as the combined use of automation and robotics 
with organizational innovation and upskilling have 
increased worker productivity in retail trade, hospi-
tals or call centres.
Second, it may not be a tragedy that low-end ser-
vices do not fulfil their role as job machines in post-
industrial economies. The constant rise in cohorts’ 
educational attainment over the last decades has 
meant that there are not only less low-skilled jobs 
but also less low-educated workers available to staff 
these jobs. Accordingly, we only observe a substan-
tial job expansion at the labour market’s bottom-end 
in those countries where large inflows of migrants 
provided an abundant workforce willing to accept 
low wages: Hispanics in the United States (Wright 
and Dwyer, 2003: 309), Eastern Europeans in Britain 
(Oesch, 2013: 96) or Romanians and South 
Americans in Spain (Oesch and Rodríguez Menés, 
2011: 531).
The evolution of labour supply thus appears as 
the blind spot of Iversen and Wren’s service tri-
lemma. It probably also constitutes an unduly 
neglected key variable of how welfare regimes affect 
social stratification and occupational change.
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Notes
1. An alternative way of increasing productivity in 
interpersonal service jobs is by raising quality and 
thus obtaining more added value per employee. This 
seems to be the strategy followed by the hotel indus-
try in the major European cities with a strong expan-
sion of 4-star hotels at the expense of more modest 
establishments.
2. Between 2002 and 2007, the annual net migration 
rate per 1000 inhabitants – inflows minus outflows 
of the foreign population over the resident popula-
tion – was 4.1 in Britain, 1.8 in Denmark and 1.2 in 
Germany (OECD International Migration Database).
 at University of Lausanne on December 1, 2014esp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
16 Journal of European Social Policy 
3. Interpersonal service workers comprise, for Germany, 
the following International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO)-1988 4-digit codes: 3225, 
3227–3228, 5000–5160, 5164–5220, 9003–9152. 
For Britain, they comprise the following Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC)-90 3-digit codes: 
370, 615–630, 640–641, 643–644, 651–690, 699, 
719–792, 870–871, 873–875, 941–959.
4. Since occupations are coded at a more aggregated 
level in the Danish survey, we combine them with 
information on the economic sector in order to obtain 
a more fine-grained measure of occupations.
5. The eight classes in Table 1 map into these four 
categories as follows: socio-cultural and technical 
(semi-) professionals as well as (associate) managers 
are merged into a single category of professionals and 
managers. Employers and the self-employed are no 
longer kept separate on the basis of their employment 
status, but are attributed to one of the four categories 
based on their occupation. Interpersonal service work-
ers, production workers and clerks remain unchanged.
6. This implies that some occupations set in quintile 2 
in 1984 are allocated to quintile 1 in 1990 if employ-
ment in the occupations of quintile 1 has decreased. 
In other words, more occupations are necessary to 
provide 20 percent of total employment in this same 
quintile in 1990 than 1984.
7. Low-educated workers are defined as having an 
educational attainment of lower-secondary school at 
most: no more than 9 to 10 years of formal education 
(ISCED levels 0–2).
8. We did not run these analyses for Denmark as our 
Danish labour force survey data do not contain infor-
mation on earnings.
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Appendix 1
Table 2. Key features of the datasets used.
British Labour 
Force Survey
Danish Labour Force 
Survey
German Socio-
Economic Panel
 UK-LFS EU-LFS SOEP
Period covered in study 1991–2008 1992–2007 1990–2007
Sample size,a early 1990s 54,760 10,965 7977
Sample size,a end of 2000s 41,402 51,062 9400
Information on occupation SOC90 3-digit
SOC2000 3-digit
ISCO-88 2-digit
+ NACE industry
ISCO-88 4-digit
Earnings included Yes (after 93) No, imputed from 
EU-SILC 04-06
Yes
ISCO: International Standard Classification of Occupations; SOC: Standard Occupational Classification.
aOur samples include individuals aged 18 to 65 years who spend at least 20 hours per week in paid employment.
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